Security reviews written for chatbots do not fit agents that call tools or write to production systems. The 2026 evaluation-escape reports (TechCrunch overview) show capability growing faster than default isolation. For the full incident narrative, start with the sandbox-escape briefing.
Identity and tool scope
- Run each agent under a named service principal with least privilege. Avoid shared admin tokens.
- Map each agent to an owner, a data domain, and a rollback path before the pilot ends.
- Prefer read-only tools first. Require human approval for CRM, code, or payment writes.
- Treat MCP connectors as exposure, not free features. See MCP connectivity and MCP supply-chain risk.
Network isolation and monitoring
- Block default paths from staging agents to production databases and customer APIs.
- Do not share OAuth apps between staging and production if you claim to have a sandbox.
- Log tool calls, destinations, and data volume. Alert on novel domains and bulk export patterns.
- Export agent telemetry into your SIEM. If the vendor cannot export logs, expect late discovery.
Vendor scorecard
- Documented isolation architecture for tests and pilots
- Human-in-the-loop gates on high-impact tools
- Exportable audit logs
- MCP or tool allowlists with scanning
- Kill switch that does not depend on agent cooperation




